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TOWARD GETTING SOME FACTS LESS SNARLED?
Caroline Allison and Reginald Green
On a' cloth untrue,
With a twisted cue
And elliptical billiard balls.
- Gilbert and Sullivan
Mistakes are mistakes.
- J. K .  Nyerere
Do not go silent 
Into that good night,
But rage, rage
Against the dying of the light.
- Dylan Thomas
1979-1985: Confidence Through Concern To Crisis
IDS has been involved in study, research, teaching and advising on sub-Saharan 
African development since its inception over two decades ago. Some IDS 
Fellows’ experience in Africa goes back a quarter of a century. In the late 
1970s most IDS members working in Africa were optimistic. Problems, mistakes 
and areas of uncertainty were clear, but the general impression was one of 
growing knowledge, more and - perhaps - more equitable development. SSA as a 
whole had apparently weathered the 1973-75 global economic shocks fairly 
speedily and appeared (as GDP figures later confirmed) to be doing better over 
1976-79 than in any previous four year period. Some countries were 
exceptions, and in 1979-80 IDS members tended to see the signs of an overall 
reversal of trend in the context of specific countries. Growing doubts were 
hastened in the autumn of 1981 by the appearance of the World Bank’s 
Accelerated Development Report (World Bank 1981).
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1981-1985: The New Conventional Wisdom
The Accelerated Development Report did not represent a totally new analysis of 
SSA nor a new academic perspective on public economic policy. Its chief
author, Eliot Berg, had been writing similar - indeed clearer and more purist 
- analytical and policy prescriptions for two decades. The very different OECD 
(and especially USA and UK) response to the 1979 as opposed to the 197*1 
international economic crises already symbolised a change towards the
emergence of a less cautious, more radical, more market and less public 
sector/state intervention oriented mood on public policy generally. What then 
was the significance of Accelerated Development?
First, it marked the first widely read and seriously studied application of 
the 'new conventional wisdom* to Africa. Second, it came at a time when the 
world climate of policy and - less uniformly - analytical opinion was already 
shifting in the directions it advocated. Third, by 1981 a majority of SSA
economies (whatever their 1976-79 records) were enmeshed in a very serious 
economic malaise which neither holding operations nor 'more of the same'
seemed likely to overcome. Governments, aid agencies and analysts were faute
de mieux in the market for something new. Fourth, Acclerated Development had 
the reputation, influence and financial clout of the World Bank behind it, a 
doubly telling point since it appeared to be a recantation of key elements
(including modernisation, large-scale, high technology and 'elimination of 
mass poverty'/'basic needs') at the core of the Bank's previous thinking 
strategic and policy advice, and funding on SSA. Fifth, any serious analyst 
or reflective decision taker could easily identify policy errors made by - or 
on behalf of - most SSA countries, especially in implementation and totally 
unprojected results. These suggested either faulty analytical tools,
imperfect data and/or the failure to relate analysis to context. The Report 
appeared to meld a number of random empirical snapshots into evidence on
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broader analytical and strategic issues. To a degree it achieved this, 
although at the expense of blurring contextual issues and diversity still 
further.
The dialogue touched off by the World Bank Report has clearly been necessary 
and in many respects positive:
the production and distribution record (whether in terms of incentive 
or equity efficiency) in almost all SSA countries since 1979 has been 
totally unsatisfactory and the type of adjustment that worked for a 
majority over 1974-75 has usually failed utterly. New contexts 
require new policies, which, in turn, require new analytical emphases 
and approaches.
the importance of real incentives - and in particular of real prices 
(especially real grower prices both official and effective, real 
wages and real foreign exchange prices) - as well as monetary and 
price considerations more generally had been underexamined by much 
structuralist analysis. At the policy level, while SSA governments 
placed very heavy stress on prices as policy tools (probably more 
than in any other region), they did so inconsistently, on the basis 
of imperfect data, with major gaps. In addition nominal and real 
prices were frequently confused.
with falling real resource availability, public sector programmes, 
public enterprises and efforts to redistribute consumption, in 
particular, needed to be re-analysed. To attempt to cut back while 
doing everything much as before was clearly likely to be an 
inefficient ’solution' by any test. Similarly the clash between the 
analysts' (and the aid agencies) concept of a benign, well informed, 
civil and participatory, administratively competent and national
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interest oriented (in the Keynesian sense) state in many SSA 
countries raised serious questions as to analytical relevance, 
the stress placed by many SSA governments and almost all external 
sources of finance on large scale, modern, capital-import-energy 
intensive approaches in all sectors (not least agriculture) had 
already been questioned by many structuralist and basic needs 
oriented analysts. With changes in relative world prices from 1973 
and declines in SSA’s earned import capacity, this strategy 
increasingly looked to be inefficient on market criteria, and 
impossible in structuralist or general macroeconomic terms, 
few SSA states, including the large minority which had actively 
promoted exports and were seen as committed to export led growth, had 
coherent external balance projections and still less articulated ways 
to adjust to these. Nor did they have coherent strategies and the 
means to implement them at sectoral and product level whether by 
price incentives, investment or other means.
overall agricultural output in SSA has been growing less rapidly than 
population for a -quarter of a century. Since 1979, with very few 
exceptions whatever strategy, investment and policy packages have 
been applied, the decline has accelerated, suggesting a need to 
rethink all applied and most analytical approaches. Certainly 
natural disasters and a clear secular fall in rainfall from the 
mid-1960s contributed. Increasing inability (by public and private 
sectors) to deliver inputs, basic services, incentive goods, market 
outlets and prices to sustain or restructure production to avert the 
worsening human impact of drought have, however, been major factors 
in this process of negative development. The decline has descended 
to the point at which 1985 sees 30 million people in real danger of
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starvation with no clear analytic, strategic or programmatic basis 
yet in sight for projecting any early reversal.
- And Its Adjustment
The dialogue has resulted in significant reappraisal of some of the 'new 
conventional wisdom's' initial tenets. That is to be expected: new
formulations always have rough edges. A near universal result of functional 
dialogue is partial synthesis, even if this is sometimes only skin deep.
First, it is now increasingly agreed that unselective expansion of primary 
exports is unlikely to lead to rapid recovery (see Martin Godfrey in this 
issue) and that, except in special cases, e.g. Botswana, self sufficiency in 
basic food is likely to be efficient in output, distribution and risk 
reduction terms. These points, the first a reversal and the second a 
clarification of Accelerated Development, are apparent in the Joint Programme 
of Action (World Bank 1984).
Second, Accelerated Development's anti-import substitution thrust has been 
modified towards a more analytically consistent position. Efficient import
substitution, in food, energy, agricultural inputs, and (less uniformly)
'incentive', i.e. basic consumer, goods, has now been added as the counterpart
of efficient export promotion in the 'new conventional wisdom' (an area to 
which Manfred Bienefeld's article on industry is relevant).
Third, having established the importance of price, the mainstream within the 
'new conventional wisdom' has become much readier to accept that, however 
necessary, getting the prices right requires parallel sectoral and micro 
policies on the physical side if it is to make lasting changes on real
relative prices or output. Michael Lipton's article argues this in respect to
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agricultural research and its relationship to agricultural policy success. 
Equally the costs, even in narrow economic terms, of radical adjustments to 
relative prices, especially in a context of overall falls in real resources 
per capita, are seen as high, i.e. price instruments are not cheap and easy to 
use. Often these are so high as to render them unusable or unsustainable 
without supporting injections of real resources to cover the period before 
output can respond.
Fourth, while clearly still of the view that in general public enterprises are 
less efficient than private and that state services and policy were 
overextended, there has been a shift toward noting diversity of experience; 
accepting that wholesale privatisation poses its own problems, not least in 
rural health and education; and seeking to achieve tighter priorities and more 
efficient use of available resources within the public sector rather than 
dismantling it wholesale."1
Fifth, at least some contributions (e.g. by the World Bank) to the ’new 
conventional wisdom* have recently reaffirmed that the economic malaise in 
sub-Saharan Africa should be seen primarily as a human tragedy and that the 
limitations of price centred policies have particularly serious negative 
implications for the absolutely poor. This is especially true for the poorest 
peasants who produce primarily food and housing for their own use. Major 
constraints to their short or long term productivity are posed by lack of 
access to basic education, health and pure water facilities. The general 
attack on redistribution has been refocused to advocate, if not yet 
articulate, more cost efficient approaches to achieving universal access to 
basic services (seen as production efficient) and to devising ways of 
increasing output relevant to the peasant household head, whose immediate 
challenge is to produce enough for his or her family to eat.
<
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Internal Versus External Orientation: Who Was Right?
In one sense both the pre-1979 advocates of structuralist internal market 
orientation and export led growth have been 'proven' correct. SSA's post 1979 
economic malaise has been gravely aggravated by the import intensity of 
national economies and by lack of effective action to maintain production of 
agricultural and agricultural input/incentive goods. But, the import
strangulation confronting half the SSA economies is in large measure the
result of sluggish export growth which was not balanced by reductions in 
import dependence, at least in certain key sectors. As a result, high export 
(more specifically import capacity) growth economies like Botswana and the 
Cameroon have been better able to weather external shocks, to stabilise and to 
maintain growth rates of GDP significantly above population.
In another sense both schools seem to have been proven wrong. It has been 
demonstrated that national (or regional) economic integration requires 
absolute increases in imports. A halfway house with moderate - but still 
unsubstitutable - import dependence causes a negative GDP multiplier of up to 
five to one for import cuts. The case for disregarding exports as a route to 
strengthening domestic oriented production appears to be fallacious. On the 
other hand, even for most export oriented economies, it has been impossible to 
maintain adequate export growth to overcome terms of trade deterioration, 
weather and other shocks and to maintain balance. Zambia - an above average 
if uneven performer in the 1960s and early 1970s - has since faced ever 
deepening balance and structural problems with no early resolution in sight, 
as Philip Daniel's article in this Bulletin shows. Botswana's export led
development - very rapid from a very low base - is about to come under severe
strain. Unless a major new mine can be developed before 1990; a breakthrough
in irrigated agriculture achieved by the same time; or the recent boom in 
non-traditional exports continues at the same rate (i.e. requiring much larger
« »
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absolute increases) for the next five years, the 1990s are likely to be a
period of severe strains on balance and low growth (see Charles Harvey's 
article in this Bulletin).
Has IDS Changed Its Position?
IDS members, apart from being very far from monolithic, have tended to be in 
the middle (and under fire from several sides) on many of these issues (see, 
for example, Sender and Smith 1983). Many of the emphases in IDS work on SSA 
have changed, partly because most members tend to concentrate on issues and 
areas of analysis they feel have been understressed, and on operational and 
policy issues they believe are in danger of being overlooked or 
misinterpreted. Given the changes in SSA, within individual SSA states, in
the world economy and in the nature of the analytical dialogue and policy 
debate on SSA since 1979, it would be surprising if this were not the case. 
Thus how much of the change is related to perception of altered reality, how 
much to additional data and how much to altered basic views or interpretations 
is unclear. Doubtless each is significant and varies between members.
Three themes have, however, remained central in IDS work on SSA. The first is 
complexity: the danger that highly simplified analysis and policy will be both 
incomplete and partly inappropriate - a theme running through several articles 
in this Bulletin, notably those by Caroline Allison, Christopher Colclough and 
Martin Godfrey. The second is diversity: the need to recognise that SSA
economic contexts, structures, policies and performance vary sharply from 
country to country, illustrated in the articles by Philip Daniel, Charles 
Harvey and Reginald Green. The third is interaction: that different strands 
of analysis and policy have a different significance when taken together
rather than in isolation - one aspect of the articles by Manfred Bienefeld, 
Michael Lipton and Hans Singer.
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The present Bulletin is part of a continuing process of exploration, 
rethinking and reformulation. Its key objective is to contribute to the 
pressing task of getting some facts straight as a precondition for applied 
analysis in complex contexts.
The first three articles in this issue centre on some of the underlying 
factors and urgent concerns in respect to agriculture and food production. 
Hans Singer's article conveys growing concern about the way in which 
emergencies have been handled and explores some practical ways both to improve 
responses and avert future crises. Michael Lipton seeks to explain the 
paradox which surrounds high levels of expenditure on agricultural research 
and notoriously slow growth in agricultural production. Caroline Allison 
focuses on three major issues of crucial significance to women in their roles 
as major food producers which have tended towards ambiguity in analyses of 
rural political economy.
The remaining contributions to this Bulletin look at two questions from 
various perspectives. First, the need to reassess elements of the old and new 
'conventional widom1 in light of contemporary developments. Second, the ways 
in which stabilisation has, or has not, been achieved in specific contexts and 
how it might be approached more generally.
Christopher Colclough questions the effectiveness of price reform in eliciting 
desired changes in production and distribution in the light of recent debates. 
He focuses in particular on the issues of domestic taxation, nominal exchange 
rates and inflation, pointing to the lack of evidence upon which analysis has 
been built within what are held to be competing paradigms.
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Martin Godfrey reassesses the debate surrounding three of the Accelerated 
Development Report*s policy prescriptions in the context of recent challenges 
to these. He finds the universal recommendation to increase agricultural 
exports guilty of the ’fallacy of compositon’, and postulates food 
self-sufficiency as the safest basis for food security. He concludes that 
dogmatic views about devaluation are unwarranted on the basis of 
country-specific experience in SSA.
One of the two country case-studies, by Charles Harvey, looks at Botswana’s 
national adjustment strategy adopted on government initiative to meet growing 
balance of payments difficulties. Despite the success of this strategy and 
its similarity in form to the conventional IMF adjustment package, he stresses 
that the causes of imbalance in Botswana and the context in which adjustment 
was undertaken are such as to preclude this case being used as a blueprint of 
action for the region. The second article, by Philip Daniel, analyses 
Zambia's inability to withstand economic shocks despite enduring attempts at 
stabilisation, and concludes that the reasons for this are less 
straight-forward than often believed.
The starting point of Reginald Green's article is the diversity of result 
revealed by Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe in their efforts at stabilisation. 
This raises questions the use and appropriateness of IMF resources in 
economies where recovery of import capacity from exports is dubious on 
technical grounds. He emphasises timing, phasing, sequencing and selectivity 
if the goal of stabilisation with adjustment is to be achieved.
The last article, by Manfred Bienefeld, suggests that the 'new consensus' on 
industrialisation is simply the 'old approach' dressed in new rhetoric, and 
reasserts the need for the former to incorporate some of the basic tenets laid
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down by the dependency school, broadly defined, whose somewhat bleak prognosis 
has been validated. He argues that this is necessary not only to understand 
the 'failure* of industrialisation, but to learn from it and challenge 
negative developments in the future.
Toward A Consensus Of Analysis?
There is reason to believe that the dialogue on SSA is becoming less heated,
rigid and controversial and more exploratory, synthesis building and
orientated to African results, at least among some analysts. In terms of 
clusters of priority actions (if not equally among their relative weights and 
sequential logic) there is relatively broad agreement among analysts who have
historically been viewed as adherents of very divergent paradigms and
strategies, although major areas of disagreement persist.
As suggested above, many of the themes of the new conventional wisdom clearly 
needed to be incorporated into both the analytically dominant (if marginal in 
most policy determining circles) structuralist approaches and operationally 
dominant (if analytically little supported) modernisation approach. Similarly 
many of the concerns of the main body of structuralist analysis have proven to 
be logical missing links in the ’new conventional wisdom', especially at the 
level of operational use. It is not much use querying who has moved further - 
most analysts tend to overestimate how much others have shifted towards them 
and to underestimate their own shifts.
However, this emergence of semi-consensus - or at any rate reasonably polite, 
mutually • intelligible discourse - should not be allowed to obscure four 
points:
First, agreement is much greater in respect to the short than the long run and
to rehabilitation and recovery than to development. Differences of emphasis 
in the short run often widen into basic differences of analysis, judgement or 
value system.
Second, if there is an agreement on detailed applied analysis it is that
simple, universal answers at the operational level are frequently not 
available, that all of us know less (as well as more) about SSA than we
thought we did five or ten years ago.
Third, in many sectors and contexts the basic data for serious and accurate 
analysis do not exist, so that articulation between broadly postulated 
principles and specific cases is very hard, and gives rise to surprising 
results.
Fourth, increasing consensus at the analytical level is not equally as evident 
at the policy level, either in SSA or globally.
And Of Policy Makers?
That policies have changed in and with respect to SSA is the self evident.
Given the falls in real command over resources within SSA, the collapse of
credit ratings for almost all SSA states and the radically more market 
oriented and resource cutting climate of global economic policy, this is 
inevitable.
Some changes are fairly standard among both external sources of finance and 
SSA governments. First, a growing sense of horror and - less uniformly - of 
weariness at apparently falling back no matter how fast one runs. Second, a 
deepening realisation that recovery will neither be the automatic result of 
global recovery nor quick. Third, very heavy emphasis on nominal prices (in
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effect if not always in intent) and on exports again less uniformly, 
especially in acute food crises and in general among some bilateral agencies. 
Fourth, a fairly clear (if sometimes suppressed) concern that a satisfactory 
strategy for the medium and long term cannot be discerned. Fifth, a greater 
emphasis on efficiency (often not very clearly defined as efficiency for what 
or for whom), partlt because of a belief that adequate resources will not, in 
fact, be available. Sixth, a great deal of certainty about certain bits and 
pieces of policy and programme - a certainty which is not always very 
convincingly linked to the quality or consistency of past advice/decisions, to 
available data or to coherent analysis. Seventh, a growing (and unwelcome) 
realisation that further demand cuts (bar those resulting from greater output 
for lower input) are in many cases likely to prove counterproductive in 
relation to exports and future consumption.
These common elements do not however, add up, to consensus, nor in many cases 
to policies which are consistent with each other, with the so-called emergent 
analytical consensus or with any very high probability of success. Most 
bilateral and international aid/development agencies as of 1985 appear, at the 
operational level, to be lagging behind the analytical dialogue (including in 
some cases their own analysts'), adopting elements of the 1981 'new 
conventional wisdom' that have not worn well and rejecting elements of their 
own past programmes which are now being more positively reassessed.
Among SSA governments there is substantial divergence. Most are in practice 
engaged in crisis containment and damage limitation because they lack the 
resources or the articulated strategic base to do anything else. A few (e.g. 
Ivory Coast) still operate on the assumption that cyclical recovery is around 
the next corner, and another handful (e.g. Nigeria) on draconic cutbacks. In 
strong economies with firm export bases this may work. Only a minority have
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either avoided or surmounted crises (e.g., Cameroon, Botswana) antf even these 
are rather cautious or perplexed as to their medium term prospects. The 
number with functioning stabilisation/structural adjustment programmes that 
are likely to survive is arguable. That Ghana and Uganda (and - until
recently - the Sudan) are often cited indicates how problematic this category 
is.
Bilateral and international development agencies are, surprisingly, given the
effects of much past advice which has been acted on, very confident both at
micro and at broad policy level that they .know what Africa should do.
Certainly much of their advice is new (though not by any means all - primary
export expansion is a theme that dates back at least 65 years) or represents a
significant shift in emphasis. The confident assumption that it is all
correct, contextually relevant, practically operational and better for having
little African involvement, is not new. In many respects it is as contrary to
the advice of some 'new conventional wisdom' analysts - and indeed some agency
analysts - as it is to that of many structuralist or basic needs analysts.
Moreover, the agencies are to date unable to provide the resources which their
own projections suggest are necessary for people to live, for economies to
hold together, and for states to survive until new policies and allocations
can bear fruit in production. This, in practice, forces down time and
resource horizons and leads back to damage containment more often than to
3structural adjustment, however defined.
Some Conundrums For Analysts And Practitioners
With analytical dialogue less antagonistic and operational exploration showing 
the problems that data gaps pose to the implementation of new approaches, 
opportunity exists for identifying and acting on key areas of data collection 
and interpretation. A series of conundrums exists.
First, many correlations are weak, go in the wrong direction or are somewhat 
less than clear in causal direction. For example, correlations over time 
between actual consumer and official grower prices are rather low. So too are 
those between grower price movements and overall agricultural output trends. 
Similarly the correlation between rates of increase in actual consumer (and 
probable effective grower^) food prices and rate of growth of food production 
appears to be negative.^ While overvalued exchange rates clearly do 
contribute to external imbalance, the initial direction of causation in 
several cases appears to be increases in external imbalance caused by shock 
leading to overvaluation, not the reverse. These are examples which urgently 
demand better checking of fairly fragmentary and weak data, and subsequent 
attempts at more contextual analysis.
Second, it is increasingly clear that the crisis in agricultural production 
dates back 25 years, not to 1979 or even 1969. It eroded the ability of most 
SSA economies to respond to post 1979 shocks and has been exacerbated by that 
inability to respond. It is, however, a separate malaise which recovery in 
other sectors and economic balances alone is unlikely to cure. As already 
noted, rises in food prices faster than the Consumer Price Index (true of 
almost all of Africa since 1979 and common from 1960 on) have not been enough 
to reverse this pattern. Clearly more study is needed. In the short run more 
food aid is vital, but preferably within a context in which (unlike the record 
in the Sahel) it lays a foundation for averting, not increasing future food 
aid needs - themes discussed in Hans Singer's article. Another strand is 
serious examination of what the African farmer does, knows, wants and could 
and would do in difference contexts. Women have received little attention, 
although it is their actions - or inactions - which largely determine whether 
food production strategies and policies succeed or fail - an area explored
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here by Caroline Allison. In addition, the previously unfashionable view that 
knowledge on how to raise output in safe, tested ways, which can be used by 
peasant farmers was very scarce in Africa so that research (and improvement in 
its cost effectiveness) was critical to agricultural analysis and policy has 
been gaining support. This is exemplified by Michael Lipton’s article in this 
collection.
These by no means exhaust the data gaps and interpretational conundra as 
illustrated in this Bulletin by the triad of articles on the requirements of 
and interrelationships among stabilisation and structural adjustment under 
different conditions. But given the present quasi consensus and ongoing 
dialogue among analysts they do illustrate the need- to build a firmer data 
base, including more sectoral and comparative work. Straight facts are a 
preconditon for straight applied analysis - especially in complex contexts. 
Their paucity in SSA calls for structural adjustment almost as much as does 
the paucity of exports and is, perhaps, one in which analysts have a greater 
direct comparative advantage in production.
Economic Malaise: Human Tragedy
It is all too easy in analysis, dialogue and prescription to abstract from
what the economic malaise in sub-Saharan Africa means to the population of the
region. In that respect the grim panorama of famine flashing across
television screens since the second half of 1984 may be as important to
analysts, advisors and technocrats, who are at one level well acquainted with 
the realities of SSA, as to ordinary viewers and decision takers who had 
previously paid them little attention.
The root causes of this human tragedy are general economic and especially 
agricultural failure exacerbated by the politics of food. Of the 30 million
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at risk of starvation in 1984-85 probably at least one million women, infants, 
men and children died between the middle of 1984 and that of 1985 who would 
not have done so had adequate domestic food production, adequate export 
earnings to finance food imports or adequate food aid been available.
Starvation is only the most evident cause of death directly resulting from
economic malaise. Others include: national child immunisation and vaccination 
programmes cut by import strangulation in respect to vaccines and fuel;
inadequate supplies of safe drinking water; and the spread of contagious,
poverty related diseases.
Death is only the last stage of immiserisation. Declines of 50 per cent or 
more in real consuming power of salaries, of minimum wages, of informal sector 
urban incomes, of purchasing power of export crops and of basic output of food 
to eat in ’moderately* drought impacted areas cannot easily be brushed aside.
The human costs of breakdowns in once reasonably well functioning basic
health, education and water services are equally appalling. Ask the woman who 
has to walk 12 miles a day because the village pump cannot be used as a result
of import constraints on fuel, spares or the mobility of the repair
technician.
Perhaps even more dangerous - not least from the point of view of future
production responses to any policies and incentives - is a growing sense of
hopelessness. Six to 25 years of economic failure or damage limitation and 
loss of what once had been attained, immiserises morally and spiritually as 
well as materially. For IDS members, the erosion of hope, morale and self 
confidence in successive meetings with their SSA friends has been among the 
most painful signs of the continued evolution of economic malaise.
*
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It is false to see the human dimension as in conflict with analytical or 
policy aspects. True production oriented policies that pay no attention to 
shielding poor and vulnerable groups are in real danger of producing repeated 
and widescale disaster in countries as poor as many in SSA. But it is 
precisely because so many Africans and so many African economies are poor that 
production is a vital goal. With so few resources available, inefficiency in 
using them to achieve priority targets has very serious consequences.
For the concerned analyst of SSA today a prime responsibility is to get more 
facts more straight. Knowing what has and is happening, and why, is basic to 
doing something about it. Trial and error is, at least in SSA today, an 
expensive way forward not just in terms of production but of human lives.
Notes
In fact the new conventional wisdom has not been consistent on price 
intervention (i.e. market management). It has urged major government 
intervention in respect to grower prices, foreign exchange prices and 
interest rates in order to raise them and on wage (and less uniformly) 
salary rates to hold them down nominally and cut them in real terms. It 
is not, in particular cases, by any means evident that the advice given 
(however sensible) bore a close relation to what any actual market 
process freed from state management would have produced.
Three of the articles in this Bulletin are revisions of longer papers 
prepared for the 'Conference on Rehabilitation and Recovery in 
sub-Saharan Africa' held in Paris August 1984, co-sponsored by OECD 
Development Centre, IDS and CERDI.
Alternatively it might lead to concentrating on a selected minority of 
states - selected for reasons such as tractability, past economic 
performance, recent policy changes and/or political durability. These 
might then receive adequate resources. Certainly a look at World Bank 
fund availabilities and its estimates of inputs needed for structural 
adjustment programmes suggest it would be hard put to support SAPs in 
more than a quarter of SSA member states even if it were totally 
satisfied with their proposals. Apart from human considerations, such 
neo-triage as a policy would increase disagreement among donors 
(perceptions vary widely among them on the selectability of particular 
SSA states) and would pose political problems for them at home, disaster 
does raise popular demand for increased aid independent of state policy 
and performance levels.
The Paris Conference agreed on over twenty priority clusters which will 
be presented in the forthcoming volume: Crisis and Recovery in 
sub-Saharan Africa: Realities and complexities.
Low grower food (as opposed to export crop) prices tend to change the 
marketing channels used more than output. In few African countries does 
even 50Í of commercially marketed food pass through official or even 
large scale, recorded private channels. In many it is as low as 10/6 
whether because of the absence of such bodies or their evasion by 
growers.
In one sense this is perfectly predictable. However, it does raise 
serious questions as to the responsiveness of supply to price incentives 
without complementary measures.
References
Allison, C. and R. Green (eds), 1983 'Accelerated Development in sub-Saharan 
Africa: What Agenda's for Action' IDS Bulletin, vol 14 no 1
Carlsson, J. (ed), 1983, Recession in Africa, SIAS, Uppsala
Clay, E. and E. Everitt (eds) 1985, 'Food Aid and Emergencies'. Discussion 
Paper 206, IDS, Sussex
Green, R. (ed), 1985, 'sub-Saharan Africa: towards oblivion or
reconstruction?', Journal of Development Planning, No. 15, United 
Nations, New York
Green, R. and H. W. Singer, 1984, 'Sub-Saharan Africa in Depression: The 
Impact on the Welfare of Children', World Development March
OECD forthcoming, Crisis and Recovery in sub-Saharan Africa: Realities and 
Complexities, Paris
Sender, J. and S. Smith, 1984, 'What's Right with the Berg Report and What’s 
Left of Its Critics?', Discussion Paper 192, IDS, Sussex
World Bank, 1981, Accelerated Development in sub-Saharan Africa: an Agenda for 
Action, Washington D.C.
___________ , 1984, Towards Sustained Development in 3ub-Saharan Africa: A joint
Programme of Action, Washington D.C.
